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JUSTICIABILITY AND THEORIES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A REMOTE
RELATIONSHIP*
LEE A. ALBERT**
This Article examines the traditional association of justiciability with basic
ideas about judicial review and judicial restraint and concludes that the
relationships are incidental and remote. It contends that, contrary to the
standard articulation and conventional understanding of standing, ripeness,
and the political question doctrine, these major components of justiciability
are not threshold or process mechanisms for foregoing or avoiding adjudica-
tion of a constitutional claim, nor are they yardsticks for determining
whether an action is private or public. Instead, they constitute a method of
formulating and resolving questions of actionability or entitlement to relief.
As a means of identifying and adjudicating the elements of a cause of action
in the public law arena, justiciability is neither a corollary of a theory of
judicial review nor a special instrument of judicial restraint in constitutional
cases. I
* This Article was originally delivered as a paper at the German-American Conference
on the Comparative Constitutional Law Aspects of Access to Higher Education held in Bonn,
West Germany, in March 1977. The Conference was funded by the Stifterverband, and was
initiated by the German-American Study Group on access to higher education, under the
auspices of the International Council for Higher Education. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the helpful obeservations of the German and American participants at the Conference.
Bice, Standards of Judicial Review under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50
S. CAL. L. REv. 689 (1977), was also based upon a paper prepared for and delivered at the
German-American Conference. The two Articles may profitably be considered together.
** Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1960, Rutgers
College; LL.B. 1963, Yale Law School.
1. The author has elaborated on this perspective in an article on standing to review
administrative action; in that area the claims are primarily statutory and judicial concern has
been with the legal interest component of standing. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administra-
tive Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims forRelief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Albert).
The discussion of standing in this Article focuses upon constitutional claims and the
requirement of injury, rather than legal interest. Injury has been the critical element in a
number of recent standing adjudications. E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The
issues directly relating to third party standing are not explored here. See note 63 infra.
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The customary understanding of justiciability begins with Marbury v.
Madison .' The seminal 1803 decision not only established judicial authority
to resolve constitutional questions, but also suggested two distinct justifica-
tions for such power: constitutional review was an unavoidable incident of
deciding cases in conformity with law; alternatively, such review was part
of the Supreme Court's special institutional responsibility as guardian of the
complex constitutional system. Although these justifications have divergent
implications for the exercise of the reviewing power, the Marbury ambigui-
ty has persisted throughout our history and remains unresolved. Conse-
quently, constitutional adjudication since Marbury does not neatly adhere to
either theory of review. Rather, a macro perspective of such adjudication
suggests a complicated blend of the two theories, an intricate tapestry of the
distinct private protective and public guardian elements implied by these
polar justifications.
3
The rhetoric of justiciability, with its insistence on proper judicial
business, reflects one manner in which the Court has accommodated and
finessed the tension between a public guardian role and the more modest one
of vindicating individual rights. By purporting to define the proper occa-
sions for constitutional review and relief, justiciability doctrines do result in
some uncertain limits on the guardian role, but they do not restrict the Court
in any ascertainable manner to conventional lawsuits. Certainly twentieth
century constitutional litigation does not track the model of private common
law litigation.4 Nor do these doctrines systematically or designedly operate
to restrict the scope, importance, or impact of the issues the Court may
decide.
5
This Article also examines two other major strands of justiciability: ripeness and the
political question. Discussion of political questions in section III is limited to domestic situa-
tions; the justiciability of issues of foreign or military affairs is not examined. It is doubtful,
however, that the analysis or the conclusions would be altered by such cases.
Other doctrines associated with justiciability include the ban on advisory opinions, the
requirement that judicial decisions be final, and the concept of mootness. The latter is the most
important in this group, though beyond the scope of this Article. See note 130 infra.
2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. A rather impressionistic selection of cases should suffice here. See O'Shea v. Little-
ton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
4. For an extensive analysis of some of the differences between common law litigation
and modern public law controversies, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
5. Delicate, controversial, or far-reaching cases are familiar. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Nonetheless, for many years American legal commentators have re-
garded justiciability as the concomitant of a particular theory of judicial
review, which accounts for a lively diversity concerning the content, func-
tion, and evaluation of such doctrines. Depending upon how one regards the
Court's appropriate role, the concept of justiciability may represent a porous
facade for the exercise of jurisdiction to vindicatq essentially public values
and interests or an improper obstacle to the piotection of contemporary
private interests or both.
6
Conflicting justifications for judicial review became the touchstone of a
significant debate some years ago when the late Professor Alexander Bickel
contended that the viability and legitimacy of the Court's authority depend-
ed upon an expansive notion of justiciability-what he termed the passive
virtues. 7 The power of review, Bickel argued, is functionally justified as a
"process for the injection into representative government of a system of
enduring basic values,''8 that rests upon the Court's special institutional
competency to articulate and develop durable and impersonal principles.
9
Accordingly, all constitutional adjudication must be rigorously and consis-
tently principled; and principle is implicated whenever the Court resolves a
constitutional issue-when it "legitimates" a government policy by uphold-
ing it as well as when it condemns it by striking it down. In a viable
functioning society, however, the imperative of principle competes with the
demands of expediency, the compromising arts; therefore, the acceptance,
effectiveness, and integrity of principle are dependent on the appropri-
ateness of time, place, and circumstance."° The many techniques of avoi-
dance, including the matrix of justiciability, are the means by which the
Court reconciles the pervasive conflict between principle and expediency
while maintaining its own integrity; such mechanisms allow the Court to
decline both implicating principle and approving compromise by withhold-
ing judicial judgment entirely."1
Hence, justiciability doctrines, in Bickel's view, are flexible, discre-
tionary rubrics through which the Court expresses its prudential, indeed
6. Compare Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts, LXX
ANi. POL. Sci. REV. 723, 739 (1976) and Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973) with Statement of Board of Governors, Society of American
Law Teachers (Oct. 10, 1976) and Chayes, supra note 4 and Comment, The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 208-13 (1976).
7. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL].
8. Id. at 51.
9. Id. at 23-27.
10. Id. at 64-72.
11. Id. at 111-98.
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political, sense that adjudication would be untimely or unwise. Since this
expansive authority to deny adjudication is an essential part of the basic
function and role of judicial review, it extends to all cases, including those
in which jurisdiction is obligatory under article I or statutory mandates.
For Bickel there could be no unyielding obligation to decide. 12 Standing and
ripeness, Professor Scharpf later added, also accommodate the Court's
dependency on private litigants by allowing it to select those cases that
provide an adequate or better presentation of the facts and issues needed for
an informed resolution.1
3
This abundance of prudential discretion was heresy for those theorists who
found the power of review rooted in the constitutionally imposed judicial
obligation tn decide the case in accordance with the applicable law. Since
the power stemmed from this constitutional duty and would not exist
without it, there could be no reservoir of inherent authority to refuse the
exercise of jurisdiction for prudential or other reasons. Such a nearly
unbounded discretion to avoid adjudication because a case presents a con-
stitutional issue would vitiate the very necessity from which the power of
review is derived. Justiciability determinations, in this view, are themselves
constitutional interpretations establishing the contours of the judicial power
conferred by that instrument. Hence, the Court does not choose to decline or
abstain in justiciability cases; it rules, as a matter of law, that the dispute is
not a "case" or that it does not present a judicially cognizable question. 14
The elusiveness and disorderliness of justiciability rulings permitted
both of these competing and contrasting schools to claim support in the
decisions of the Court. Commencing analysis with a normative theory of
review, however, neither school carefully distinguished between how such
doctrines had been and should have been employed. The colloquy was
primarily prescriptive.
Under the influence of these macro views of justiciability and judicial
review, legal theorists focused neither on the process of decision in justicia-
bility cases nor on the questions implicitly resolved in standing, ripeness, or
12. Id. at 126. See also Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
13. Scharpf, Judicial Review of the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 529-33 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Scharpf].
14. H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 5-10 (1961); Gunther,
supra note 12. But cf. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958) (at times it may be better for the
matter to be resolved without an authoritative judicial solution).
Professor Wechsler observes that the general law of remedies, both statutory and decision-
al, also determines whether there is a "case" requiring adjudication. WECHSLER, supra. This
additional basis for a justiciability determination is puzzling since the availability of a remedy
clearly relates to entitlement to relief rather than the existence of a "case" and article III
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political question rulings. 15 That inquiry was particularly deflected by a
well-accepted and entrenched tradition in which standing, ripeness, and the
political question are seen to pose threshold issues, subject to a preliminary
inquiry distinct from and anterior to questions concerning the matter for
adjudication, the merits of the claim for relief. 16 This tradition posits
justiciability as an entry barrier designed to ensure adversity, concreteness,
and maturity in a case and to impart legitimacy to the decision. Accordingly,
justiciability is concerned with process; it resolves whether the claim can be
adjudicated, without addressing whether the claim is actionable under sub-
stantive law.17
This Article departs from this legacy by maintaining that standing,
ripeness, and political question rulings do entail adjudication of a compo-
nent of the claim for relief, and contends that such rulings ultimately reflect
a determination of whether substantive constitutional policies are best
served by providing or denying relief. A close examination of justiciability
resolutions reveals that its doctrines do not reflect exogenous general princi-
ples by which injuries, interests, or issues are categorized. Rather, standing,
ripeness, or political question doctrines necessitate inquiry in each case into
the particulars of the claim for relief, and resolution rests upon the constitu-
tional provision governing actionability. Indeed, the central merit issue of
constitutional validity often is decided, albeit implicitly,. under the political
question or ripeness rubric. Moreover, construction of the constitutional
basis for the claim, not an external calculus, reveals the sufficiency of party
interest and injury in standing and ripeness cases. In short, the factors
controlling justiciability are identical to those governing the actionability of
claims and entitlement to relief. Hence, justiciability doctrines are substan-
tive and the questions they pose are not preliminary or threshold.'
8
jurisdiction. It also omits the possibility of remedies created by the Constitution itself. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970);
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Scott].
16. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
& n. 1 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968); BICKEL, supra note 7, at 122-25; Scott,
supra note 15, at 670-77.
17. See BICKEL, supra note 7, at 122-25; Scharpf, supra note 13, at 528-35; Scott, supra
note 15, at 670-83.
18. This view is now receiving some emphasis in the literature. See Henkin, Is There A
"Political Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the
Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1445, 1522-29 (1971); Comment,
Standing To Sue ForMembers of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665 (1974). See also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). In that opinion Mr. Justice Powell observed: "Essentially, the
standing question in [prudential] cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on
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This perspective facilitates an accurate understanding of the premises
of a justiciability ruling, reveals the issues and factors on which these
doctrines focus, reconciles some wayward inconsistencies among the cases,
and allows an appreciation of some costs of implicitly deciding merit issues
as threshold ones.
I. STANDING
Traditionally, a determination of whether a litigant has standing to obtain
review of government action has involved two questions. The first, deemed
to be associated with the case and controversy requirement of article III,
requires actual injury to the plaintiff from the action he challenges. The
second requires that injury be to a legally protected or cognizable interest. 19
The ripeness test, which is examined in part II, is closely related; it focuses
on whether a future injury and its present impact are sufficiently defined,
concrete, and certain to warrant relief.20 Although standing includes ripe-
ness-a plaintiff in an unripe case is also without standing-ripeness em-
phasizes the timing of litigation while standing focuses upon the adequacy
of a plaintiff's present interest.
The origins and evolution of standing and ripeness doctrines illuminate
the character of the problems with which they deal. Neither rubric was
explored or elaborated in constitutional controversies during the nineteenth
century. 2' These issues did not arise under the substantive law employed in
such controversies. American courts had not inherited a body of public law
from which rules of actionability for constitutional cases might be derived;
nor did they seek to create one. Hence, there was no jurisprudence of public
law governing the resolution of constitutional challenges to government
action. Indeed, the Constitution itself had limited applicability to claims
against government officials. It provided no affirmative rules of actionabil-
ity and no principles for the determination of the legal sufficiency of the
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a
right to judicial relief." Id.
19. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 208 (1962).
20. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-56 (1967); International
Longshoreman's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947).
21. Although the Court had adverted to the legal rights of litigants in some early cases,
see, e.g., Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33
(1885), it had not elaborated on standing until well into the twentieth century. The classic case
of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), does not discuss standing or "case or contro-
versy" though it is viewed as the seedling of the concept. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-
94, 97-99 (1968); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818-19 (1969). Ripeness is also a late addition to the legal lexicon. See
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium, 277 U.S.
274 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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claim asserted. 22 Constitutional principles were relevant only to certain
defensive matter in a case-the ultimate validity of the authority exercised.
The other standard legal issues in a case, actionability in particular, were
controlled by a distinct body of substantive jurisprudence, the familiar and
well-developed Anglo-American common law that had been formulated in
disputes between private persons over private rights. In short, constitutional
challenges to government action had been assimilated into the established
tradition of private common law adjudication, not merely in form, but as a
matter of substantive law.
Accordingly, a plaintiff, in challenging official action, had to plead a
recognizable common law claim, such as contract or trespass; the defend-
ant's official authority to act was introduced as a matter of defense; and the
Constitution or statute entered by way of the plaintiff's retort that the
official's conduct was beyond valid legal authority. 23 Because private com-
mon law rules of actionability were relatively clear and well-defined on such
matters as party interest, causation, and injury, there was no occasion to
deal with who may sue, or when (litigation was mostly retrospective), save
that these questions are always implicit in the determination of entitlement
to relief. 24
This common law assimilation, coupled with the unavailability of
public law concepts of actionability, had a profound influence on standing
decisions in the early twentieth century when increasing government inter-
vention and regulation of the economy gave rise to new and varied claims,
primarily challenges by private business to competing public enterprises and
public subsidies. Injury was not in issue, since most claims involved
acknowledged pocketbook harms. The common law, however, favored
private competition and offered little protection against it; consequently, the
22. E.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1900); In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443,
500-02 (18$7). This proposition is no longer true. See Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 1109 (1969).
23. E.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620-23 (1912); Elliott v. Swartwout,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 46, 49-52 (1836). See also Hill, supra note 22, at 1128-31.
24. For example, it is a well-recognized requirement in litigation between private parties
that a claimant may not obtain judicial relief unless he has something at stake. But the issues of
injury and party interest are resolved under the substantive rules of tort or contract law,
without reference to a concept of standing or ripeness. See, e.g., Ultramares v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Further, the notion of proximate cause in tort law makes clear
that injury and unlawful conduct are not themselves sufficient to warrant relief. There must be
"duty" or "legal cause," which are also concepts derived from policies and purposes of tort
law, not requisites of justiciability. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928). The question of who may sue, or when, has always been an integral part of the
actionability of a private law claim.
1977] 1145
1146 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1139
Court held these plaintiffs to be without a legally protected interest against
government-sponsored competition.
25
This line of cases reveals no institutional or process factors supporting
a discretionary refusal to decide; nor were the constitutional issues regarding
the scope of federal power unfamiliar. Rather, such cases rest on a determi-
nation that competitive injury was not actionable. The decisions are prob-
lematic only in their reliance upon the private common law rather than the
Constitution as the legal basis for the ruling. Otherwise they do not differ in
substance from more modem and constitutionally based rulings on the
sufficiency of a public law claim, e.g., the Court's recent holding that
reputational injury per se is not actionable under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
26
Concurrent with this restrictive tradition, however, there developed a
standing principle that was destined to become exceedingly permissive. In a
trilogy of claims in the 1920's against the Interstate Commerce Commission
for competitive injuries to railroads and shippers, the Court established that
members of a regulated industry would have standing as competitors where
a protective intent could be inferred from the statutory provision upon which
the claim was founded. 27 That is, judicial assessment of the purposes and
policies of a regulatory program would determine whether a complainant
had a protected legal interest against competitive injury. Finding such a
protective purpose was not dispositive since there remained the issue of
whether the action was unlawful-the question of official legality. But
reliance on a standard that looked to the purposes and policies of the statute
as the basis for establishing the boundaries of relevant interests as well as an
official's duty to heed them quite plainly reflects a ruling on the actionability
of a claim.
Until recently, this test of standing demanded a clear showing of
protective intent28 and generally was limited to cases brought under a statute
specifically providing for judicial review; the common law standard pre-
vailed in cases of nonstatutory review, including those directly founded
upon the Constitution. The two standards interacted when the Court, influ-
25. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940)
(government imposition of labor requirements on businesses with government contracts did not
furnish such business with standing).
26. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
27. Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S.
258 (1924); Edward Hines Yellow Pines Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923).
28. Compare Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) with Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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enced by a common law indifference to certain harms, declined to infer a
protective purpose from legal constraints on government authority, even
where such a purpose was apparent.
29
Major changes in both the injury and the legal interest components of
standing occurred about a decade ago, though their scope and substance
remain uncertain. The Court nominally rejected the legal interest test be-
cause it went to the merits, as indeed it did, and substituted for it a
requirement that the plaintiff's interest arguably be within a zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by a statute or the Constitution. This standard
was extended to cases of nonstatutory review as well. The Court also
stressed that injury is not limited to the familiar economic type, but includes
a variety of environmental, aesthetic, and spiritual harms."
Although an arguably protected interest may not seem different from a
protected legal interest, the Court no doubt intended liberalization by the
new formula. The Court's own applications of the formula manifest an
intent to detach the inference of protection from standard statutory interpre-
tation and to restrict the preliminary inquiry into standing. 3I Hence, any
plausible suggestion of a policy recognizing the plaintiff's class, regardless
of legislative history or contrary evidence, has been held to satisfy the zone
standard. Moreover, the plaintiff's interest may be expressed on a very
general level, thus broadening the class protected. 32 There need be no close
relationship between statutory indicia of protection and the provision in-
voked to establish illegal action. 33 Even these loose applications of the new
test, however, do not quite divorce standing from the merits, for the variety
of sources establishing an arguably protected interest are an integral part of
an overall regulatory program and thus relevant to the claim of illegality
under accepted canons of statutory interpretation.
The more important question left open in these decisions concerns what
a plaintiff under the new zone standard must go on to establish on the merits
29. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Berry v. Housing & Home Fin.
Agency, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965).
30. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); cf.
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (loss of social benefits of living in
an integrated community).
31. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970); cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (broad construc-
tion of standing under § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
32. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400
U.S. 45 (1970).
33. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(users of wilderness assumed to be protected by federal laws governing national parks and
forests).
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in order to obtain relief. Upon satisfying the previous legal interest require-
ment of actual legislative protection, he had only to demonstrate that the
official action was unlawful. The substitution of the zone test for the legal
interest standard might be taken to imply that the necessary showing for
relief remains unaltered, which would eliminate the need for a plaintiff to
prove that he is actually among those with a protected legal interest.14 Some
form of injury and the easily satisfied condition of the arguably protected
interest would suffice to enjoin official action.
35
Implication alone, however, is not an adequate basis for such a major
change in the requisites of a claim. That substantive result would greatly
expand the scope of actionable claims against officials and would endorse a
rather unique and far-reaching principle of official liability or accountabili-
ty. Indeed, it would afford relief to almost anyone incidentally affected by
official action and thus approximate acceptance of a public action concept
-litigation whose acknowledged purpose is the policing of official conduct
rather than party relief. The Court has steadfastly refused to do this.
36
Additionally, insistence on injury alone, without evaluating it under some
normative standard, such as statutory protection, 37 ceases to be functional or
indeed intelligible. 38 In view of the multiple, widespread, and highly inci-
dental impacts of government action, the alluring simplicity of entitling
persons significantly aggrieved to relief is illusory. The formula masks a
host of nettlesome problems, including the very recognition of what is
cognizable as injury as well as the consequent necessity of ranking and
selecting better and best plaintiffs39 -an undertaking that would raise seri-
ous questions of propriety for American courts.
34. Cf. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (investment company appar-
ently entitled to relief because Congress arguably legislated against the type of competition
challenged).
35. The zone standard has not been a significant barrier in the lower courts. See K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.07 (3d ed. 1972); cases collected in Sedler, Standing,
Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1972).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 429 (1952); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayers may not use a federal
court as a forum in which to air their generalized grievances, but where there is a logical nexus
between the taxpayer status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated, plaintiff will have
standing to bring the claim).
37. Statutory protection need not be the only normative standard for determining whether
a plaintiff's interest entitles him to relief. There are judicial criteria for specifying whether an
interest should be protected. See Albert, supra note 1, at 456-64.
38. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 484-85, 528-31 (1965).
39. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633, 638 (1971) (arguing that a court may in
its discretion accept jurisdiction over a suit brought by a plaintiff without a protected interest).
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The Court's affirmation that actionable injury includes environmental,
aesthetic, and recreational values has provoked the more enduring and
troublesome issues of standing. Users of parks and the wilderness, televi-
sion listeners interested in a balanced presentation of issues, and history
buffs seeking to preserve a favored monument or building have all been held
to satisfy this standard of injury.4 These injuries significantly differ from
the more obvious economic or physical variety in that they are highly diffuse
and have a modest impact upon an individual plaintiff. Constituting an
affront to sensibility, such harms are also subjective, subject to the wishes of
the pleader. Not suprisingly, litigation over these injuries has been under-
taken by environmental and other public interest organizations; such litiga-
tion is highly suggestive of a vindication of citizen interests and the public
good.
Some of the difficulties may be seen in contrasting two environmental
controversies, Sierra Club v. Morton41 and United States v. SCRAP.42 The
Sierra Club, a prominent conservation organization, sued to enjoin construc-
tion of a ski resort in a semiwilderness area on national forest land. It
claimed standing solely as an experienced, dedicated organization with a
special and informed interest in wilderness preservation, without alleging
harm to its members. A divided Court held that this assertion of public
interest representation or ideological harm failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement. In contrast, five Washington, D.C., law students in SCRAP
challenged a comprehensive nationwide rate increase of two and one-half
percent on all freight moving by rail on the ground that it would discourage
the movement of recycled goods and thereby cause more refuse and waste of
natural resources. For standing, the students alleged that they personally
would suffer recreational and aesthetic harm as users of parks and other
natural resources in the Washington area. This time a divided Court
affirmed that these were sufficient allegations of injury to establish standing.
The anomalies are patent43 and are said to arise from the Court's
strained attempt to force the array of recent public interest litigation into the
older narrow mold of adjudication over private or personal injury. Both
candor and integrity, such critics argue, compel recognition of these modern
challenges as essentially public actions, whose purpose is to check official
40. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
See generally Orren, supra note 6, at 733-37.
41. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
42. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
43. See Sax, Standing To Sue: A Critical Review of The Mineral King Decision, 13 NAT.
RES. J. 76 (1973).
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illegality and prevent harm to the general good, but not to vindicate personal
interests. The injury is undifferentiated and ultimately falls upon the citizen-
ry at large." Accordingly, a new adjudicative framework is necessary to
accommodate this litigation.
Although initially plausible, this position is founded on the dubious
premise that American public law adjudication primarily affords protection
to tangible, highly specific interests of individuals in cases without group or
public interest overtones or implications. That assumption is belied by the
business of constitutional litgation during this century, and quite likely the
last one as well. First, legal interests, though highly fragmented and widely
shared, have long been characterized as personal in American courts, as
illustrated by challenges to the national income tax,4 5 apportionment of
Congress, 46 prayer in public schools, 47 financing of public schools,48 and
university admissions policies. 49 Second, the interests of listener, environ-
mentalist, and consumer litigant are not quite the equivalent of the public's
interest in the good society (if they were, suit presumably would not be
necessary). Individuals are indeed personally affected when parks are de-
spoiled, programming is biased, or unsafe products are sold. Third, the
subjectivity of injury and the blend of ideology-vindication of society's
norms-are also a notable part of American constitutional history. The
judicial recognition of intangible or impalpable harms, for example, to
speech, religion, or family autonomy, 50 is not of recent vintage, and organi-
zational sponsorship and direction of litigation has been commonplace. The
objection that a plaintiff's real purpose is to advance a public cause rather
than his own interest also misses the mark. Such an elusive motivational
distinction is a peculiar notion in American courts. Moreover, social causes
have not been alien to the business of the Court.
More basically, these characteristics of constitutional adjudication are
the ingredients of the Court's reconciliation of Marbury's divergent theories
of judicial review. They provide the wherewithal by which the Court exists
in the tension between adjudication designed to police and implement
constitutional norms for an entire society and adjudication designed to
44. See L. JAFFE, supra note 38; Chayes, supra note 4, at 1302-10; Orren, supra note 6,
at 736-41; Monaghan, supra note 6, at 1368-86.
45. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
46. Wesberry v. Danders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
47. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
48. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
49. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
50. E.g., Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
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protect highly personal interests. They, like justiciability doctrines general-
ly, are the measures that render clear-cut and ultimate choice unnecessary.
This fluid tradition of adjudication, not a rigid garden-variety private model,
should be the focus of those critics who advocate a special mold for the
"new" public interest litigation.
There have been exceedingly few unalterable requisites for a "case or
controversy." Where, for example, constitutional values have been deemed
important enough, and the personal injury requirement a real barrier to
litigation (which it rarely is), the Court has relaxed, perhaps eliminated, that
element of a claim. The principal occasion to date is Flast v. Cohen,51 the
case allowing a taxpayer to attack the use of federal funds for religious
schools as a violation of the establishment of religion clause in the first
amendment. The Court maintained that there was individual injury, but it is
obviously obscure. Similarly, a spending claim based on the establishment
clause of the first amendment provides the rare occasion when an intangible,
perhaps ideological, injury to a government official has been found suffi-
cient to allow him to challenge the validity of a program that he is charged
with administering. 52 Although not so reasoned, these holdings have been
limited to claims concerning separation of church and state; such claims
have ranked high among basic constitutional norms.
That injury is widespread does not present troublesome standing prob-
lems-enjoining a federal permit to an unsafe atomic energy facility whose
radius of danger was nationwide would not be problematic. 53 But given the
general injunction against citizen suits, difficulties do arise where injury is
diffuse, novel, and susceptible of being characterized as a citizen's political
interest in the lawful conduct of government or the social good. Cases
presenting new, intangible injuries well reveal that the recognition of
whether injury is actionable rests on a normative judicial judgment. Such
judgment is derived from a determination of whether the substantive law
invoked creates a personal interest or right in the complainant that has been
infringed by the challenged action. Injury, of course, need not be physical or
economic; it may be to an interest created by statutory, constitutional, or
common law, as the recent public interest litigation over environmental and
51. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
52. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968); cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 444 (1939) (State senator's right to challenge the validity of a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution upheld).
53. Cf. Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (in their
capacity as private citizens, members of Congress had standing to seek to compel the White
House to disclose documents concerning nuclear tests); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Schlesinger, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971), motion for injunction denied, 404 U.S. 917
(1971) (conservation group had standing to seek to enjoin underground nuclear test).
1977] 1151
1152 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1139
aesthetic harms well attests. Indeed, this normative foundation for recogniz-
ing injury is not peculiar to novel or intangible harms.
Where injury is familiar, however, no question of whether there is an
interest worthy of protection is seen to arise. The only question remaining is
whether the plaintiff has actually sustained the asserted injury, as if the
inquiry were solely empirical. The Court's insistence on "injury in fact" as
a component of article III standing, thus seemingly beyond Congress' power
to alter through the creation of new statutory interests, reinforces this
empirical perception of injury. By positing a constitutional concept of
injury that transcends the legal provision governing the merits, the Court
obscures the nexus between the actionability of harm and its normative
predicate, and thus imposes an uncertain and possibly inoperative test. 4
Two recent cases denying article III standing are on point. In Schlesin-
ger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,55 members of the armed
forces reserve and others attacked the membership of congressmen in the
reserves as incompatible with the constitutional prohibition on persons
holding office under the United States from concurrently serving in Con-
gress. Similarly, in United States v. Richardson,56 a federal taxpayer
invoked the constitutional mandate for a published account of government
expenditures as invalidating a statutory exception for expenditures of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The Court denied standing in each case,
holding that there was no concrete or particularized injury to the plaintiffs;
their interest in these practices was common to all citizens. It was not merely
this lack of differentiation, however, but the unfamiliar and impalpable
interests asserted that led the Court to view the asserted injuries as purely
intellectual or political aggrievement.
54. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Court has
acknowledged ample congressional power to create legal interests on which standing may be
predicated. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1972); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court recently has expressed a more qualified view of
the extent of this power. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. at 41,
n.22 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). This fluctuating judicial attitude
reflects uncertainty over the scope and character of an article III limitation on Congress' power
to create actionable injuries. The Court has never denied effect to an act of Congress on this
ground, save perhaps for the perplexing and probably discredited ruling in Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
55. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
56. 418 U.S. 166 (1974); cf. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (because petitioner
disclosed no interest other than that of a citizen and member of the bar of the Court, he lacked
standing to bring a motion for leave to file a petition for an order requiring Mr. Justice Black to
show cause why he should be permitted to serve as an Associate Justice of the Court).
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These cases illustrate that the article III concept of "injury in fact" is
neither self-defining nor empirical. Rather, its content involves a subtle
judicial judgment founded upon a construction of the substantive constitu-
tional mandate in issue. Thus, as some dissents in these cases argued, it
would not be implausible to infer from the public spending clause a protect-
ed taxpayer interest in expenditure information, 57 or from the separation
clause a voter's legal interest in representatives free from a potential execu-
tive influence. 58 Indeed, the latter is typical of protections afforded by
standard conflict-of-interest precepts. To be sure, the Court declined so to
construe these prescriptions. These provisions, in its view, gave rise to no
definable legal interest, and therefore there was no immediacy or actuality to
the alleged harms. But there is no objective calculus for saying that these
harms are less immediate or real than injury to schoolchildren from unequal
educational financing or to voters from unequal districting. What differs is
the source of the judgment, the law on which the claim is founded. Hence, it
was a choice between competing views of the unconstrued constitutional
provisions in Richardson and Reservists that determined whether there was
"injury in fact." An empirical inquiry or construction of article III would
cast no light.
Recent cases focusing upon the cause and sufficiency of injury similar-
ly illustrate the relationship between injury and the merits. These questions
are posed in actions to enjoin future as well as present conduct, thus
illustrating the dual aspects of the injury requirement-the plaintiff's present
plight and the harm that may occur later. The issues are therefore at the
intersection of standing and ripeness, choice between them depending upon
which harm is emphasized by the Court.59 Standing was the basis of
decision in Laird v. Tatum ,60 the case in which certain political activists
contended that the operation of the Army's surveillance and data-gathering
system on peaceful civilian activities "with a potential for disorder" had a
present inhibiting effect upon public gatherings and expression, although
any present or future use of the information was unknown. In the Court's
view, this claim lacked a threat of specific future harm, as well as present
objective harm; the plaintiff's asserted fear of military surveillance at best
amounted to a "subjective" chill on association and speech.
The line between subjective and objective is not apparent; the Court
has found the requisite objective inhibition on speech and association in
57. 418 U.S. at 232-35, 239 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. 418 U.S. at 203-07 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. The Court has stressed standing rather than ripeness in recent cases. See Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
60. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
1977] 1153
1154 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1139
scores of vague, broad, or uncertain modes of regulations and proscriptions,
including government surveillance programs. 61 These infringe on expres-
sion by the very uncertainty of their scope or invocation. What differentiates
Laird, however, is the Court's own assessment of the claim-the extent of
impact from this covert, unexplored operation tacitly weighed against the
consequences to the system itself from subjecting it to a searching inquiry.
A "subjective" chill was obscure shorthand for saying that a first amend-
ment calculus did not warrant the costs of exposing the Army's system of
intelligence gathering or planning.
Where costs of this kind are not at stake, the Court has accepted far
more speculative and tenuous claims of injury without addressing a standing
problem. Consider, for example, San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez,62 the significant school-district finance case, in which injury
to school children was said to result from unequal expenditures for public
education by school districts within a state. Harm from the challenged
practice therefore rested on a highly controversial relationship between
relative dollar inputs and educational quality, which was both unknown and
unproven in the case. Indeed, the Court noted the vagueness and uncer-
tainty of harm as one of several weaknesses of the equal protection chal-
lenge. But it did not seek to truncate or simplify an extensive explora-
tion of all aspects of the claim by reliance on standing. Laird and Rodgri-
guez are not necessarily inconsistent; the Court's invocation of an objective
calculus of harm in Laird, however, makes them appear so.
Such generalized articulations of injury isolated from the claim invite
charges of inconsistency, selectivity, and ad hoc decisionmaking; judicial
expressions of skepticism about the merits, predictably commonplace in
such standing decisions, provide further support for such charges. Discus-
sion of these issues would be more coherent and edifying were the Court to
address the sufficiency of injury as a question pertaining to a particular
claim, an interest created by the law invoked, and not as an arching principle
of standing.
63
61. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Strombergv. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See
generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. The recent ruling of the New York Court of Appeals on an applicant's challenge to a
medical school's preferential admission program provides rare recognition that injury to the
complainant from an unlawful practice is an essential element of one's ultimate right to relief,
an integral part of the claim and hence the merits. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39
N.Y.2d 326 (1976). Noting that the complainant was 154th on a waiting list for admission, the
court ruled that elimination of a preference for minority candidates would not entitle him to
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II. RIPENESS
Ripeness issues, mirroring considerations similar to those of standing, are
posed in pre-enforcement review proceedings, where anticipatory judicial
relief is sought against some future action that a plaintiff fears may be taken
against him. The Court has articulated ripeness as a dual inquiry: whether
the substantive issue of validity is fit or appropriate for judicial resolution,
and whether hardship to the party is sufficient to warrant adjudication.
64
Viewing ripeness as another process-oriented aspect of institutional compe-
tency, commentators stress the fitness inquiry over hardship; its function is
to prevent premature judicial interference with government action and to
avoid entanglement in abstract, poorly defined disputes. The mature,
focused conflict not only affords the Court an informing perspective on the
actual working or impact of laws, a view not available in the legislative
process, but also provides the Court with greater choice among the grounds
for decision, an opportunity thus to decide in the narrowest compass.
Accordingly, ripeness looks to the posture and record of a case, the
need for particularized facts, specific allegations, and empirical data. 65 As
legal commentators observe, the relevancy of these variables is a function of
admission and thereupon denied relief. The court emphasized that its dismissal was not a
threshold matter of standing, but was based upon a finding, after a hearing on the merits, of a
fatal defect in petitioner's claim-he was not prejudiced by the preferential system. This
distinction, of course, is the gist of the argument in the text. See also Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S.
1090 (1977).
As indicated, this Article does not deal with the issue of third party standing, situations in
which an injured party appears to rely upon the claim and interests of others who are not before
the Court, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Many of these cases rest on
derivative rights, a claim by the litigant that implementation of a legal policy favoring nonpar-
ties implies a protection for him because of his relationship with the nonparties, e.g., doctors
invoking the protected right of women to an abortion. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In other cases, however, litigants more plainly
assert independent third party interests. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). At times the
Court allows such claims as a means of better protecting the rights of nonparties, particularly
where there are obstacles to suit by such persons. E.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963). But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See generally Albert, supra note I, at 464-
73; Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
Cases involving third party standing have been unusually explicit on the relationship be-
tween standing and the policies underlying the substantive constitutional principles invoked.
For instance, a defendant's standing to exclude evidence illegally seized from codefendants
was rejected on the ground that the deterrent effect of such additional exclusion was out-
weighed by the need for reliable evidence at trial. Hence, the standing ruling is openly based
upon competition between fourth amendment interests and other policies relating to the merits
of the claim. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364 (1968).
64. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
65. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 123-26, 139; Scharpf, supra note 13, at 528-32.
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the Court's formulation of the appropriate constitutional standard for deter-
mination of the issue of validity. An embracing or abstract decisional
principle requires far less record development or focus than a standard
involving refined balancing and close distinctions. 66 Hence, a preview of the
merits is an essential part of evaluating fitness of the issue. Such authors,
moreover, note that seemingly inconsistent decisions can be reconciled by
reference to differences in the Court's initial view of the standard governing
the issue of validity.
67
Contrary to the emphasis on fitness in the process-oriented position, the
hardship issue-injury-appears to be critical in most ripeness decisions;
consequently, the merits are implicated even more directly. More precisely,
ripeness is more profitably viewed as a determination of whether the threat
of future injury and its present impact on the plaintiff are sufficiently
defined, certain, and substantial to be actionable, not in the abstract, but
under the legal provision on which the claim is based. Accordingly, a ruling
that a case is not ripe, like injury rulings in standing cases, is the equivalent
of a dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. Because ripeness cases
involve different claims founded on diverse legal provisions, no real ques-
tion of consistency among them arises.
Although discussed above for the standing question it presents, Laird
v. Tatum68 is also a ripeness case involving a determination that the
government action-the surveillance program-did not work a present or
future injury insufficient to warrant first amendment concern. That amend-
ment's protection of expression was construed to be relatively insensitive to
the impact of data-gathering alone, even though it is hypersensitive to more
coercive forms of inquiry. Similarly, in the recent troublesome ruling in
Warth v. Seldin,69 the Court demanded an unusual showing of certainty in
the causal relationship between past and future injury and the challenged
conduct. Moderate and low income families charged that they were prevent-
ed from residing in an affluent suburban community by virtue of its zoning
ordinances that restricted housing to expensive, single-family, detached
dwellings. 70 The restriction, they alleged, was designed to exclude plaintiffs
66. Scharpf, supra note 13, at 530.
67. Id. at 529-33.
68. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
69. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
70. Actually, there were several classes of plaintiffs asserting a challenge: low and
moderate income families seeking housing; taxpayers and property owners from a nearby city;
residents of the suburban community; and firms seeking to build low-cost housing in the
suburban area. This array of interested parties, particularly the builders, makes the Court's
insistence on near-certain causation rather more problematic. See 422 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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by ensuring that housing within their budget had not been and would not be
available. The Court, parsing the complaint in the manner of a common law
pleading, held that these allegations failed to establish either that the plain-
tiffs' inability to find affordable housing had stemmed from the exclusionary
practice or that judicial relief, if afforded, would result in housing plaintiffs
could afford to lease or buy. Because the plaintiffs had not specified a
particular housing project that would have been or would be built without
the zoning restriction, they had not demonstrated the necessary connection
between their deprivation and the allegedly illegal action.
As a general pleading requirement of causation between illegal action
and injury, this ruling is indeed extraordinary and patently inconsistent with
SCRAP and a host of other decisions. 71 As a special rule of causation
applicable to actions against local zoning ordinances, it is at least intelligible
and arguably defensible; it reflects a judicial skepticism about zoning claims
that places them in a distinctly disfavored category. The Court suggested as
much in its otherwise gratuitous observation that zoning laws, vital to urban
planning, belong peculiarly within the province of state and local govern-
ment. 72 Imposing onerous burdens of proof or certainty on a plaintiff in a
disfavored action is not extraordinary,73 but more explicitness than that
71. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Railroad Transfer Serv., Inc.
v. Chicago, 386 U.S. 351 (1967); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
The future contingencies that might affect the welfare or interests of the parties in most of
these cases were no less significant or unforeseeable than those in Warth. They are more or less
present in any action where the benefits from declaratory or injunctive relief are only anti-
cipatory.
72. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18. See also id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). An exclusionary
zoning claim may also involve the vexing issue of disproportionate racial impact and segrega-
tive intent. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
73. A dissent observed that the holding in Warth "can be explained only by an indefens-
ible hostility to the claim on the merits." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). For a similar line of reasoning, see Scott, supra note 15, at 684-85 ("concern over
the decision role the court would have to assume may lead it to reject standing for a plaintiff
whose injury and stake would, in a different context, pass muster").
Conversely, favored or preferred constitutional claims may lead to especially liberal rules
of standing or ripeness, as can be seen in freedom-of-expression adjudications. See Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
Viewing Warth as a disfavored claim for relief also accounts for the Court's disposing of
the causation issue on the pleadings, without opportunity for discovery or development of the
facts at trial. Notwithstanding liberalized rules of pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a plaintiff is still obliged to set forth in the complaint a legal claim on which relief
can be granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 8. The adequacy of allegations going to the legal sufficiency of
the claim may always be tested, at the outset, by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12. If, as is the author's view, causation is an essential element of the claim,
then it is properly subject to challenge by such a motion to dismiss. Hence, the charge that the
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present in Warth is necessary to avoid the charge of manipulating the injury
concept to suit the occasion and also to justify immunizing zoning laws in
this manner.
74
Two ripeness cases classically invoked for the fitness of the issue view
of ripeness are United Public Workers v. Mitchell75 and Adler v. Board of
Education .76 In Mitchell, a group of governmental employees asserted their
desire to engage in local political campaigning in violation of the Hatch
Act's ban on political activities by federal employees. Except for one who
had been charged with a violation, the complainants had not actually
engaged in prohibited conduct prior to the suit. As a result, the Court found
no special injury to these plaintiffs, though it went on to adjudicate and
reject the claim of the sole plaintiff who had engaged in prohibited ac-
tivities. In contrast, the Court in Adler ruled upon an unimplemented state
statute authorizing the listing of groups as subversive organizations and the
dismissal of public school teachers who belonged to them. No group had yet
been designated, and the complaining teachers had not specified any par-
ticular activity from which they were deterred. Instead, they asserted that
the inchoate program generally inhibited their freedom of association. The
Court upheld this program without adverting to ripeness. For those who
view ripeness as depending on record development and fitness of the issue,
these cases are distinguishable on the ground that the Court in Adler deemed
the merits to be governed by a broad and abstract constitutional standard-
state employment is merely a privilege-while in Mitchell the issue might
Court was precipitous seems unwarranted. One should observe that there are ample opportuni-
ties for a plaintiff to amend the complaint, FED. R. Civ. P. 15. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F.
Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
74. The Court imposed a very similar burden of injury causation on the plaintiffs in
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), a statutory case
strikingly parallel to Warth. A number of indigent plaintiffs challenged an Internal Revenue
Service ruling extending favorable tax treatment as "charitable organizations" to certain
nonprofit hospitals, while reducing the obligation of such hospitals to serve indigents. Injury
was wanting, in the Court's view, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that, but for the
tax ruling, the hospitals would have provided or would provide greater health services to them.
As in Warth, the Court revealed doubts about the merits, for the claim involved private
individuals seeking to challenge the federal tax liability of someone else. Excepting certain first
amendment religion challenges, such intrusions in the taxing system are virtually unprecedent-
ed. See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue
Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1972), where a private party sought to compel
the criminal prosecution of another, the Court insisted on an unusual certainty of injury and
causation in the context of a highly disfavored action. As the Court suggested, privately
initiated prosecutions are practically unknown in the United States. Observe that the rejected
challenges in Simon and Linda R.S. were not likely ever to become "ripe" for adjudication.
75. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
76. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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have been governed by a close balancing principle to which particular
political conduct and enforcement policy were highly material. 77 It was not
so governed, however; the Court proceeded in the Mitchell case itself to
resolve the merits by a minimum rationality standard as broad and abstract
as that in Adler, without regard to particularizing factors.
78
There is no pat reconciliation. But it is plausible to observe that under
first amendment doctrine prevailing at the time, the alleged injury in Adler
was of greater established substantive concern than that in Mitchell. Con-
stitVtional doctrines protecting expression traditionally have been finely
attuned to the Adler-type injury, since that injury stemmed from a vague
program generating considerable uncertainty and thereby casting a cloud
over associational activities. Vagueness, and later overbreadth, have been
the most common grounds for invalidation in first amendment cases. 79 By
contrast, in Mitchell the conduct proscribed by the Hatch Act-partisan
political activities-was relatively clear and had not been a staple of first
amendment adjudications. Hence, the interests asserted in Mitchell were far
less recognizable under prevailing doctrine. Though this does not wholly
explain Mitchell, it does allow us to deal with a more recent case, United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Car-
riers,80 where the Court once again upheld the Hatch Act, but this time at
the behest of certain plaintiffs who, at the time of suit, had not engaged in
conduct violative of the Act.
Although the pre-enforcement plaintiffs in Mitchell and Letter Car-
riers were similarly situated, the Court did not acknowledge a ripeness
problem in Letter Carriers. There are two underlying reasons for this
difference in treatment: first amendment jurisprudence had developed con-
siderably in the intervening decades, and the impact of broad statutes on
77. Scharpf, supra note 13, at 531-32.
78. 330 U.S. at 94-103 (1947). The Court did discuss some particularizing facts about the
single viable plaintiff, but only for the purpose of differentiating him from the other rejected
complainants on the issue of standing. These facts, however, are entirely irrelevant to the
Court's exceedingly broad and general reasons for upholding the Hatch Act; the ban on political
activities was valid because it had some conceivable relationship to legitimate governmental
objectives.
The Court's recent decision reaffirming the validity of the Hatch Act is far more discrete
and cautious. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973).
79. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See generally Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960); Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
80. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
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protected activity now presented a far more standard claim of injury.
81
Second, unlike Mitchell, the constitutional claim in Letter Carriers rested
on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, thus delineating well-established
and significant first amendment interests. 82 Hence, injury in Letter Carriers
posed no question of adequacy under the first amendment and therefore no
issue of ripeness.
Ripeness issues in cases of statutory review of final administrative
action, usually agency regulations, are similar to those in cases of constitu-
tional review of statutes, save that the derivation of relevant injury from a
regulatory program is more problematic. The statute on which a plaintiff
relies for the claim of illegality is often uninformative on the scope of
actionable injuries. Administrative regulations have multiple and diffuse
impacts, and the governing statutes rarely reflect legislative concern with a
spectrum of potential injuries. 83 Hence, the Court apparently relies on its
own notions of legitimate harm and interests deserving of protection, and
perhaps also places greater weight on the fitness of the issue. These factors
are not easily separable in many cases.
A characterization of unfitness for review, however, manifests yet
another direct interaction between ripeness and the merits; a determination
that an administrative regulation is not ripe seems equivalent to a ruling that
the regulation is generally, or facially, valid. Since the prematurity ruling
requires a record of actual enforcement and specific application as prerequi-
sites to adjudication, it necessarily posits that validity depends upon how the
regulation is administered. But that is to hold, at least implicitly, that the
regulation is consistent on its face with the agency's enabling statute and
therefore valid in its application to the standard foreseeable situations, the
paradigm cases.' 4 Since a pre-enforcement plaintiff almost always attacks a
regulation in its standard applications, or on its face, the ripeness ruling is,
therefore, a rejection of the claim for relief. Although a full resolution of
the merits, that ruling is made offhandedly and at the threshold, before the
Court openly confronts and explores the claim.
81. The overbreadth doctrine in first amendment adjudications particularly flourished in
the 1960's. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). See generally Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
82. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
83. See Vining, supra note 18. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967) with Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
84. See Vining, supra note 18, at 1522-29. This analysis would not apply where there is no
standard foreseeable application or where all illustrations appear to be hypothetical.
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III. POLITICAL QUESTION
Legal scholars have regarded the political question doctrine as the classic
technique of judicial avoidance, a way of allowing a governmental decision
to stand without involving the Court in support of its legitimacy. 5 As an
assertion that final decisionmaking competency over an issue rests with
another branch of government, the political question formulation stands in
clear opposition to a judicial inquiry into constitutional validity and thus
constitutes an exception to the judicial duty "to say what the law is. "86
Marbury v. Madison established that constitutional questions were subject
to judicial inquiry; the political question rubric posits that some are not.
Because the political question ruling attaches to a substantive issue rather
than the particular parties or timing of a case, it also posits an enduring form
of restraint.8 7 Despite these doctrinal manifestations of judicial abstention,
the political question machinery does not operate as a decision not to decide.
Indeed, it works even more clearly as a delineation and construction of
claims for relief, for it directly adjudicates the validity vel non of govern-
ment action under the Constitution.
The several ingredients of a political question were explored in Baker
v. Carr,8 the case holding that legislative districting presented a justiciable
issue. Constitutional commitment of a decision to the President or Congress,
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and respect for
coordinate branches of government are the most important elements in the
Court's explication of the doctrine. Two recent celebrated cases, Nixon v.
United States8 9 and Powell v. McCormack,9° well illustrate the current
approach to the notion of constitutional commitment to another branch and
its close relationship to judicial standards for decision.
After the indictment of several former Presidential aides for Watergate-
connected offenses, the Special Prosecutor caused a subpoena duces tecum
to be served on President Nixon, requiring production of tapes and writings
85. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 183-98; Scharpf, supra note 13, at 535-38.
86. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924).
87. Scharpf, supra note 13, at 535-38.
88. The Court provided the following summary of the elements:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to invoke a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
89. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
90. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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of specified meetings between the President and his aides. In seeking to
quash, President Nixon asserted two separate defenses. First, he contended
that the production order presented a political question because article II,
properly construed, commits the decision over disclosure of a President's
conversations and meetings to the President alone. Given the President's
exclusive authority to decide these matters, any issue regarding executive
privilege is nonjusticiable. Alternatively, he argued that article II, properly
construed, gives rise to an absolute executive privilege or, at a minimum, a
privilege sufficiently broad to prevail over the Special Prosecutor's sub-
poena.
91
Although the first claim sounds in jurisdiction-competency to decide
as between Court and President-and the second in the merits-conceding
power in the Court-the Court in Nixon considered and rejected these
claims together. In requiring production, it relied upon the needs of the
judicial process for evidence material to pending prosecutions and also upon
the delphic observation in Marbury that it is "the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.'"92 This statement apparently
provides the basis for rejection of the President's claim to exclusive con-
stitutional authority over disclosure. But it is responsive to such a commit-
ment claim only on the premise that Marbury established the Court as the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution with the final say on all constitu-
tional issues. Therefore, competency was in the Court, not the President, to
establish the boundaries of an implied executive privilege. That premise is
not only an exceedingly broad reading of Marbury, but, taken seriously, it
repudiates any concept of constitutional commitment as a basis for a
political question ruling. There is a limiting factor, however, in Nixon v.
United States: the President's political question and merit claims both rest
upon nearly identical considerations of confidentiality and autonomy, and
hence they are easily merged in deciding the case.
That was not true, however, in McCormack, an earlier decision with a
more extensive exploration of the constitutional commitment claim. Acting
pursuant to article I, section 5-"Each House shall be the judge of the ...
qualifications of its own members"-the House, upon sustaining allega-
tions of serious misconduct during previous terms in office, refused to seat
Representative Adam Clayton Powell after his re-election to Congress. In a
suit against sundry House officials, Powell claimed that his exclusion from
the House violated the constitutional mandate that representatives shall be
91. 418 U.S. at 692-93, 705.
92. Id. at 704-05.
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elected by the people. He contended that the House's decision was constitu-
tionally unauthorized since the requirements of age, citizenship, and resi-
dency prescribed elsewhere in article I constitute the exclusive legal qualifi-
cations for admission to the House.
93
The commitment question turned on whether article I, section 5 con-
ferred exclusive and final authority upon the House to judge and rule on the
qualifications of elected representatives. Resolution of that issue, in the
Court's view, required an inquiry into what the House legally may consider
in judging eligibility-specifically, whether the House is limited to the
prescribed minimum qualifications of age, residency, and citizenship, or
whether it may also consider such other factors as character and past
conduct. After a searching examination of the relevant constitutional mate-
rials and policy considerations, the Court adopted the more restrictive
interpretation of section 5, concluding that there was "no discretionary
power in Congress to deny membership by a majority vote." 94 There was no
textual commitment since the House's ruling was not authorized by the
relevant text of section 5.95
This reasoning has understandably provoked criticism that the Court
confused jurisdiction-who has competency to decide-with the merits-
the ultimate correctness of the House's decision. After initially posing the
proper question, commitment, the Court proceeded to answer another:
whether the section 5 qualifications were limited to the minimum qualifica-
tions specified in section 2. Since that issue was the mainstay of Powell's
claim for relief, the Court decided Powell's entitlement to relief before
deciding whether his claim was justiciable. 96
This is an accurate description, but one may ask how, or indeed
whether, the Court intelligibly could determine if there was a textual
commitment and, if so, just what was committed, without an examination of
the scope and content of section 5. For example, would the same section 5
inquiry be equally inappropriate had Powell been excluded for past failures
to vote with the Democrats or to support Administration proposals? Alterna-
tive sources for resolving the commitment issue, other than the standard
mode of constitutional interpretation and construction of the relevant provi-
sion that the Court employed, are not apparent. The text of the Constitution
93. 395 U.S. 486, 493 (1969).
94. Id. at 548.
95. 395 U.S. at 547-50. Decisions to expel a member of Congress during his term of office
require a two-thirds vote of the respective House. U.S. CON T. art. I, § 5. The justiciability of
expulsion decisions was not decided by the Court in Powell.
96. Sandalow, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 172-73 (1969).
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does not demarcate or even suggest that areas or issues are political or
beyond judicial power; an express delegation of power to Congress or the
President does not support such an inference.
97
Beginning with Marbury, issues concerning the scope of executive or
legislative authority have been staples of constitutional review; almost all
federalism and separation of powers challenges have been found to be
justiciable. 98 Hence, as a textual matter, section 5 is no more indicative of
commitment of exclusive authority than, for example, the clauses delegating
to Congress the power to regulate commerce or to tax. Beyond the text,
constitutional history or the intent of the framers cannot be said to illuminate
commitment issues. That historical background reflects scant consideration
of the Court's general power to review congressional and executive deci-
sions. 99 It is therefore not likely to shed more light on particular issues or
powers intended to be beyond the reach of judicial review. Accordingly,
constitutional commitment must be inferred from some characteristic of the
subject matter or ruling in issue.
The critical characteristic is implicit in the Court's formulation in
Nixon and McCormack of the relevant question for resolution of the
commitment claims. In both cases the controlling question is whether
appropriate constitutional interpretation gives rise to standards or criteria for
judging the exercise of the executive or legislative power in issue. Under
this approach, commitment rulings are derived from a lack of applicable
decisional standards bearing upon the decision of a political branch, while
justiciability and review follow from a formulation of relevant constitutional
constraints."° Since resolution of the claim on the merits always involves
precisely this determination-whether a relevant constitutional standard has
been violated-the notion of textual commitment becomes nominal. If the
Court decides that the Constitution dods not establish limiting criteria-that
the challenged decision falls within an area of broad executive or congres-
sional discretion-there is no meritorious claim for relief. The commitment
rhetoric is superfluous, and the notion of competency-that the issue is not
97. Cf. Rezneck, Is Judicial Review of Impeachment Coming?, 60 A.B.A.J. 681, 682-83
(1974) (read in isolation, § 5 may allow the inference that some issues are political questions,
but this interpretation does not hold up in light of such decisions as Nixon and McCormack),
98. E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Buckley v. Valco, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
99. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 105-07, 115-18, 120
(1973). See generally L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967).
100. Cf. Karst & Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 47, 52 n.26 (1974) (propriety of judicial review may turn on a balancing of two factors: (I)
the degree to which the process approximates a legal proceeding, and (2) the political factors
involved in the process).
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meet for adjudication-is illusory. These conclusions have no practical or
heuristic significance; they do not precede, but follow, the Court's legal
inquiry into the governing constitutional norms. Moreover, they follow only
if the Court decides that the challenged action was within the authority
conferred by the Constitution and that it does not violate any legal constraint
on that power. '
0 '
That judicial undertaking is plainly not to deny or forego judicial
review. Upon concluding that there is no conflict with the Constitution, the
Court may then state that the challenged ruling is political, since the
Constitution places it within the lawful authority of a political branch of
government. But that assertion is different in kind from the nonjusticiability
predicate of the political question doctrine.
In characterizing questions as political, however, the Court has not
distinguished between a true political question case, where the issue is not
subject to inquiry, and the spurious kind, where the issue is found to be
within the lawful discretion of the political branches. A good number of
political question rulings, however, appear to be spurious, resting as they do
on a judicial determination of permissible discretion in the political
branches. The decisional considerations in such cases reflect familiar factors
and doctrines of constitutional adjudication that operate to validate the
authority of the political branches in the ordinary justiciable case. Thus,
many so-called political question cases are not exceptional; they reflect a
standard constitutional construction establishing that the challenged political
decision is lawful and therefore final. 102
Well-established constitutional doctrines and standards of review af-
ford ample room for the lawmaking and administrative powers of Congress
and the President. 0 3 Consequently, no special political question rubric is
needed to allow for appropriate judicial deference to legislative and execu-
tive authority. Moreover, judicial recognition of such authority need not be
covert. Where the Court finds that an executive or congressional ruling is
within an area of delegated discretion warranted by the Constitution, it is not
apparent why the Court should not say so and explicitly dispose of the case
101. Cf. Henkin, supra note 13, at 605-06 (dismissal of case because the act complained of
was within the power conferred upon the executive branch by the Constitution essentially has
nothing to do with the political question doctrine).
102. Chicago & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1848). Compare United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949) with Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952) and United States exrel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See also
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
103. See, e.g., FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976); Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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on the merits, dismissing it for failure to state a claim, without the becloud-
ing imprimatur of the political question doctrine. There is nothing per se
illegitimate or suspect about the exercise of discretionary political authority,
as, for example, in the President's power to select or fire cabinet members.
The characteristic ambiguity of a political question ruling may be seen
in Coleman v. Miller,10 4 a case with notable nonjusticiability credentials.
Several Kansas legislators asked the Court to annul that state's ratification of
a constitutional amendment on the ground that it occurred after the Kansas
legislature had once rejected it and over thirteen years after Congress had
proposed the measure, pursuant to its article V power. The Court declined,
ruling that both claims posed political questions for Congress to resolve.
Though a valid ratification had to occur within a reasonable time after
proposal, that determination entailed a broad range of complex factors
suitable for legislative, not judicial, appraisal. Similarly, the legal conse-
quence of a prior legislative rejection was also for Congress to adjudge. In
light of the political question emphasis in the opinion, many read it to hold
that issues concerning the amendment process are nonjusticiable; article V
commits them to Congress, or they are not subject to a judicially manage-
able standard. 0 5 But that may be an unduly expansive reading.
Observe that the Court itself chose to adopt the unmanageable rea-
sonable time criterion as the appropriate constitutional period for ratifica-
tion. I06 That choice was a concomitant of the Court's general construction of
article V affording Congress broad legislative authority to regulate the
amending process. Pursuant to that authority Congress initially might have
established a specific time limit for ratification and prescribed a rule govern-
ing prior rejection.107 Though Congress had not settled these matters, its
power to do so surely persists throughout the amending process and may be
exercised at the final stage of acceptance. Such continuing supervisory
authority in Congress is particularly appropriate in view of the fair number
of unanticipated issues that might arise during the protracted course of state
by state ratification. In light of this construction of article V, a judicial
resolution of the timing and rejection issues in the first instance, however,
would be flatly inconsistent with the recognition of continuing discretion in
Congress. In that limited sense the issues presented in Coleman were
political, and the Court's decision reflects a not unusual respect for the
104. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
105. C. WRIGHT, THE HANDBOOK OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 53 (3d ed. 1976); see, e.g.,
Scharpf, supra note 13, at 570, 587-89.
106. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residence requirements of fixed duration
violated equal protection).
107. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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separation of powers and lawmaking powers of Congress. Indeed, the Court
shows similar deference to an administrative agency with jurisdiction to
decide in the first instance.10 So interpreted, the Coleman holding does not
establish an extraordinary immunity for article V issues; nor does it indicate
that Congress' actual exercise of power under article V is itself nonreview-
able or that all issues concerning amendments are nonjusticiable.1
09
McCormack and Nixon also refer to some prudential strands of the
political question doctrine, particularly the respect due to coordinate
branches of government and the enforceability of the Court's mandate. The
Court summarily dismissed the former by observing that interbranch con-
flicts arising from divergent interpretations of the Constitution do not in-
volve a lack of respect for a coordinate branch, even where judicial con-
struction concerns a matter peculiarly related to the affairs of Congress or
the President. The resolution of those conflicts is a necessary and ordinary
incident of judicial review. 
110
It is now clear that want of power to enforce a judicial decree, or the
possibility that a mandate might not be obeyed, is similarly irrelevant to
justiciability. Hence, enforcement problems were barely addressed in these
two cases even though the Court was without coercive power in both, and at
least one posed a serious possibility of defiance.' 1 As these cases also
indicate, the contemporary importance or political temperature of an issue,
at least without more, has not been a prudential ground for nonjusticiability;
the Court has adjudicated a large number of momentous, controversial,
and divisive issues.'"
2
Judicially manageable standards and their kin, the availability of mate-
rial information, are more amorphous political question elements and not
easily encapsulated. Like the preview of the merits under ripeness, their
invocation quite directly rests on the Court's view of the appropriate sub-
stantive rule for resolution of the claim. The apportionment controversy well
reveals the complex interactions of an apparently intractable social issue,
discovery of a manageable standard, and availability of relevant informa-
tion.
108. See, e.g., Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). See generally
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
109. Accord, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 132 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368
(1921).
110. 418 U.S. at 703-05; 395 U.S. at 548-49.
11I. 418 U.S. at 706-07, 713-16; 395 U.S. at 517-18.
112. See note 5 supra.
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Prior to Baker v. Carr113 in 1962, legislative districting had been
assumed to pose a political question. 114 Because of the relationship between
districting and ongoing legislative representation, apportionment also pre-
sented a situation on which the political branches would not act. Hence, the
Tennessee apportionment in Baker reflected severe population disparities
resulting from over fifty years of legislative inertia. Predictably, the Court
was asked to break the political stalemate, and it responded, very modestly,
in Baker. The majority held that a voter's equal protection challenge to
population disparities in legislative districting was justiciable. While dis-
claiming any view of the merits, the Court stated that familiar principles of
equal protection-e.g., minimum rationality-obviated any problem of
judicially manageable standards and also suggested that Tennessee's ancient
plan might not reflect any intelligible policy. "15
Although indeed moderate, this was not a wholly adequate response to
the dissent of Justice Harlan, who argued that if an apportionment plan
embodies an intended distribution of political power among legitimate
interest groups, it must always be found to have a rational basis. 116 More
basically, Justice Frankfurter rejected the possibility of a manageable stan-
dard by viewing apportionment as a complex political process resting on
numerous elusive adjustments for demography, economic and social group-
ings, mechanisms of party control, legislative leadership, traditional al-
liances, as well as population. He also stressed that neither history nor the
structure of American institutions nor prevailing contemporary practice lent
credence to a principle of equal population among districts and admonished
the Court against rhetoric and empty promises. "17
The Court did answer these dissents two years later when it established,
in Reynolds v. Sims, 118 a strict standard of substantial population equality
among districts for both Houses of a state legislature. Justice Stewart, in
dissent to a companion case, argued that the Constitution prohibits "the
systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate," but does
not demand one man-one vote. 119 More recently, the Court has reinterpreted
substantial equality to allow the states some deviations, ten percent or so,
without a reason, and larger ones where justified by traditional district lines
113. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
114. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118 (1912).
115. 369 U.S. at 226.
116. Id. at 330-38 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 267-70, 299-302, 323-25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
119. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (Lucas is one of several companion cases to Reynolds decided the same day).
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or some other explanation. 120 The Court also has declined to scrutinize
political gerrymandering 12 1 and has approved supermajority voting require-
ments' 22 as well as certain limited franchise elections. 
23
What emerges from these cases is the observation that there was no
dearth of standards available for the apportionment issue. Moreover, the
judicial inquiry and task in formulating the appropriate constitutional rule
were not different from the Court's undertaking in defining the contours of
free expression, privacy, or racial equality. 124
As the opinions reveal, the several alternative standards included a
demand for minimum rationality, a requirement that a plan legitimately
reflect the many factors listed in Justice Frankfurter's dissent, or a condition
that it not systematically frustrate majority will. These standards suggest a
relatively permissive approach pursuant to which most apportionment plans,
save perhaps the Tennessee crazy-quilt variety, would have been upheld.
But any objection to that result must be based upon one's view, on the
merits, that apportionment plans should be subjected to a more demanding
standard.
Some standards, no doubt, are more manageable than others, and
Justices Frankfurter's and Stewart's views of legitimacy in apportionment
offer formidable problems of judicial administration and seemliness. They
contemplate an extensive fact-oriented inquiry into the actual political con-
figuration in a state, including data on voting blocs, bosses, party control,
and the like. 1" The Court might rely on presumptions and other means to
alleviate these difficulties, but it also initially might choose a more workable
standard. The formulation of constitutional principles to take account of
difficulties of administration, application, and proof, as well as apparent
legitimacy, is not unique to apportionment. Such considerations have played
a substantial role in the foundation of constitutional doctrine. Thus, first
amendment jurisprudence is replete with substantive principles shaped by
administrative and prophylactic concerns. 126 Furthermore, the Court rapidly
abandoned a showing of psychic harm by persons challenging separate
120. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
121. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
122. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971) (multimember districts).
123. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
124. See notes 126-27 and accompanying text infra.
125. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 246-47 (1968).
126. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970);
Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 75-85,
89-115 (1960).
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public facilities in the great desegregation decisions. 12 7 Similarly, the
Court's special equal protection standard nominally demanding a "compel-
ling state interest" may be responsive to intractable problems in choosing
among multiple legislative purposes and in weighing sundry social and
economic policies.
Hence, it is indeed likely that the formulation in Reynolds was respon-
sive to problems of manageability and information posed by alternative
standards, which may account for the Court's not rigorously extending the
logic of one man-one vote to other issues of political responsiveness and
equality. It may also explain the leeway afforded states to deviate from
population equality; an unqualified commitment to an embracing ma-
joritarianism need not have been the sole decisional consideration in Rey-
nolds.
Some. would argue that this concession admits that while numerical
equality may be a defensible principle, it competes with a number of other
relevant but unprincipled factors in legislative districting. Accordingly, the
Court should have abstained from applying the equality principle and also
from approving the expedient factors. Instead, it should have held the issue
to be a political question so that government may continue to take account of
the extra-legal factors, without the Court's lending its legitimacy to those
matters. 
128
The problem with this reasoning is obvious-if it is proper for the
political branches to rely upon factors other than population, why should the
Court not say so by fashioning a constitutional standard that allows for
appropriate flexibility and discretion? Conversely, if social or political
compromises are improper in districting, causing illegitimate deviations
from equality, then what is the objection to application of the one man-one
vote principle? Surely judicial acknowledgment of a world of social,
economic, and political realities does not impeach the Court's prestige or
legitimacy.
These considerations render it difficult to conceive of a domestic
constitutional issue that should be deemed a political question because of the
absence of judicially manageable standards. In Gilligan v. Morgan,
129
however, the Court reached essentially this conclusion. Following the
shooting of several persons at Kent State University by members of the
127. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) with Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) and Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(per curiam).
128. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 191-97.
129. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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National Guard, some students filed an action claiming that the Guard had
been so poorly trained, equipped, and commanded as to make the reckless
use of force inevitable. Some members of the Court thought the case moot
because the students had graduated by the time of review and the Guard had
since adopted new and different rules and training practices governing the
use of force. 130 The majority seemed to agree, 3' but went on to stress that
130. 413 U.S. at 12.
The mootness doctrine is closely related to standing and ripeness, as well as the ban on
advisory opinions. Though concerned with party interest and injury, the mootness issue arises
from events occurring after the initiation of litigation, specifically, factual or legal changes
which alter the nature of the dispute, injury, or the plaintiff's benefit from relief.
The general mootness rule is that an actual live controversy must continue to exist at all
stages of litigation, not merely at the outset. It thus reflects a narrow role of judicial review
focusing upon the vindication of individual party interest. But the relaxation of this rule,
evidenced by its frequent exceptions, strongly suggests a broader, more issue-oriented function
of review. Mootness decisions are more erratic than other aspects of justiciability, and the legal
literature is less substantial.
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), a standard instance of mootness, involved an
attack on a law proscribing anonymous handbills, which prevented the plaintiff from distribut-
ing literature in future campaigns of a named congressman. During the litigation the congress-
man was appointed to a longterm judgeship, and the Court dismissed the case as moot; it was
"wholly conjectural that another occasion might arise when Zwickler might be prosecuted for
distributing" handbills. Id. at 109. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
The most important and vexing qualification on mootness is for issues "capable of
repetition, but evading review." Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
There are two elements in this formulation-a likelihood of future recurrence of harm to the
plaintiff or the group he represents, and a probability that future cases similarly will evade
appellate review by the passage of time.
Some complexities of this doctrine remain. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The abortion challenge in Roe was initiated by a pregnant,
unmarried woman, pseudonymed Miss Roe, seeking to terminate pregnancy, and a childless,
married woman, not then pregnant, pseudonymed Mrs. Doe, seeking to avoid the possibility of
future childbirth for health and personal reasons. Though Miss Roe was no longer pregnant
when the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that her claim was not moot, since
pregnancy "often comes more than once," and pregnancy litigation would never survive
beyond the trial court. Id. at 125. But Mrs. Doe's claim was not ripe; future injury to her from a
restrictive abortion law was too contingent and speculative. The alleged present injury, an
interference with a normal martial sex life, was deemed insubstantial. Id. at 128. In DeFunis,
however, a narrowly divided Court found no threat of further harm to DeFunis from a law
school's preferential admissions procedure-DeFunis was then in his last term of law school-
and also no inherent evasiveness in the issue-the next challenge would reach the Supreme
Court more quickly.
Some distinctions are possible, though not entirely persuasive. DeFunis was not formally a
class action, and the Court recently has excepted mootness issues from the general ongoing
requirement that a class plaintiff must be a live, representative member of the class. For
mootness purposes, it is enough that the plaintiff was a proper class representative at the outset
or early stage of the litigation. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1975). But class action
status did not figure in the decision in Roe. One may also observe that the recurrent harm in
Roe, pregnancy, might affect the named plaintiff, whereas DeFunis himself could not be
prejudiced again by the admissions process. The injury distinction between Miss Roe and Mrs.
Doe, however, seems unsupportable on any notion of quantum or likelihood of present or
future harm. Perhaps one can say that the issue in Roe is inherently more evasive of review
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this was not an action to seek damages or to enjoin some specific Guard
action; rather, it sought continuing judicial surveillance and regulation over
the Guard to assure adequate training and compliance with the new rules.
The majority ruled that the relief sought presented a political question,
because Congress and the President jointly are responsible for the training
and weaponry of the Guard and also because courts have no competence
over these matters.
1 32
In so holding, however, the Court made clear that specific activities of
the Guard, past or future, were subject to judicial review in a suit for
damages or an injunction.' 33 This qualification, suggested by past cases, 
134
demonstrates that there are constitutional standards by which to judge the
legality of Guard training and operations, including its intended use of
force. It is also irreconcilable with the assertion that control over the Guard
has been committed to the political branches. Moreover, had a state been
contemplating sending the Guard into a prison or university under orders to
use deadly force when appropriate for good order or discipline, clearly the
Court would have had no difficulty formulating a constitutional principle for
determining whether such instructions or previous training presented an
unreasonable hazard to life. This decision is doubtlessly overkill. It ex-
presses, however, the Court's more defensible judgment that, absent some
specific threat, defined activity, or unlawful instructions, there should be
wide discretion in the political branches over matters of Guard training and
riot control. For this reason the Constitution does not demand or warrant
continuous judicial scrutiny. As we have seen earlier, the labeling of such a
holding as a political question ruling is not only needless, but also mis-
leading.
CONCLUSION
Having explored how standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine
operate in a particular case and the issues they necessarily pose and resolve,
than that in DeFunis-mootness in the latter, after all, arose from a chance victory in a lower
court, which ordered his admission, whereas pregnancy cannot in any case persist through the
protracted appellate process.
But these are quibbles, and it appears that mootness has less principled content than other
doctrines of justiciability; it may be manipulated to allow or forestall adjudication. As a federal
official is said to have characterized the DeFunis principle, "Difficult cases are moot." D.
CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (2d ed. 1975). The public as well as
private orientation of public law adjudication, however, is indeed mirrored in the curious
course of mootness decisions. See generally Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 88 HARV. L. REv. 373 (1974).
131. 413 U.S. at 5.
132. Id. at 10-I1.
133. Id. at 11-12.
134. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16(1972); Duncan v. Kahanamaku, 327 U.S.
304 (1946).
JUSTICIABILITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
we may now explicitly address some larger themes: justiciability doctrines
as the underpinning for a theory of judicial review and as a special mecha-
nism of judicial restraint.
The conclusion, succinctly put, is that these doctrines do not follow
from or support any particular theory of judicial review; nor do they have
any exceptional role as a restraint or limitation on judicial power. To be
sure, they do relate to these subjects, but they do so in the same manner as
substantive constitutional rules. Constitutional principles of actionability,
formulated on a case-by-case basis in response to a large variety of claims,
do not specifically reflect or support a comprehensive theory of judicial
review. Viewed as a body of jurisprudence, however, such rules may indeed
illuminate the scope and character of constitutional adjudication. As an
integral part of this jurisprudence, standing, ripeness, and political question
decisions may shed some light on the theory or practice of judicial review.
But justiciability cases are not a peculiar source of learning in this regard.
Similarly, a number of substantive doctrines in constitutional law,
e.g., the minimum rationality standard or the presumption of validity, are
manifestations of judicial restraint. So too is the requirement of party
interest and injury in standing and ripeness invocations or the recognition of
congressional or executive discretion in political question situations. But
this restraining effect is also an ordinary feature of rules of actionability.
These intersections of justiciability doctrines with notions of constitu-
tional review and restraint are perhaps sufficient to lend an initial plausibili-
ty to the received tradition that such are the raison d'etre of the standing,
ripeness, and political question matrix. The error of overstatement, howev-
er, results from a failure to recognize that the intersections are a characterist-
ic of substantive constitutional principles, and not a special feature of a
distinct category of justiciability principles.
One may ask whether an inquiry into the justiciability-merit nexus is
merely nominal or scholastic, since a court does resolve the substantive
issue, whatever the rubric. But concepts do have significance in the judicial
process. The justiciability rubrics invite both court and parties to engage in
shadowboxing-to discuss and decide party interest and issue adjudicability
in the abstract, as if the particulars of the claim before the court have no
bearing upon the matter. There being no workable criteria separate from the
claim, precedents seemingly announcing general principles of justiciability
are invoked as the relevant learning on the issue. This process is not very
helpful or enlightening; indeed, the very attempt is both distracting and
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productive of poorly articulated decisions. As we have seen, justiciability
rulings are often question begging, obscure, or misleading. They are plainly
not exemplars of judicial candor, for the determinant of a ruling, the
actionability of the claim, cannot be appropriately articulated at the
threshold stage of deciding to decide. Discussion of the claim is therefore
summary and impressionistic, as befits an assessment prior to direct explo-
ration of the merits. Moreover, justiciability decisions, because they purport
to rest on general principles, often appear to decide considerably more than
they do, as in Warth135 or Gilligan.136 Such breadth and implications are
indeed a curious feature of rules supposedly designed to limit the issues and
avoid reverberations.
Party interest, injury, and causation are meaningful and relevant con-
cepts when used to evaluate a claim for relief, public or private. Difficulties
arise from the attempt to detach such concepts from the particulars of a
claim and thus to transform them into a general recipe for making a case.
Such an attempt necessarily founders upon several familiar features of
constitutional adjudication. Constitutional litigation presents too many in-
teractions in variant circumstances to be susceptible to prefabricated for-
mulas of general applicability. Embracing principles of justiciability are no
more feasible or desirable than other sweeping or absolute standards govern-
ing resolution of the merits, 37 say, for example, the right-privilege
dichotomy.
Not only are the protean concepts of standing and ripeness shaped by
the contexts in which they are applied, but their assessment in any case is
largely a matter of intensity and degree. No single standard is likely to
persist because the degree and intensity of interest, harm, and causation in
constitutional disputes fall upon a lengthy spectrum. At one end are those
constitutional proscriptions protecting against highly palpable harms where
causation and victim are easily discerned-such as a fourth amendment
claim against a police officer for brutality. At the other end are those
mandates protecting against spiritual deprivations where neither cause, harm,
nor victim are easily identifiable-such as a first amendment challenge to
135. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
136. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
137. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Reliance on broad standards is not
often successful, cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (improbable construction of
Oklahoma statute). Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968) and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972).
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practices aiding religious institutions 38 or a fourteenth amendment attack on
racial classifications in jury-member selection.
139
There is yet another reason why evaluation of claims for relief figures
large in standing and ripeness adjudication. It is familiar knowledge that
some constitutional interests present stronger credentials for recognition
than others; certain liberties are borne by a "momentum of respect lacking"
in others."' The elements of selection are subtle, no doubt. But the hierar-
chy of constitutional values behind such selection does not rest upon a
foundation of standing or ripeness concerns. Any correlation between the
standing-ripeness variables, such as quantum of injury, intensity of individual
interest, and certainty of causation, and the relative importance of a constitution-
al claim is fortuitous."'4 Consider the intensity of these variables, for example,
in the context of apportionment or racial gerrymandering challenges. Accord-
ingly, even if it were possible to apply a fixed justiciability threshold, it would
be costly to do so, since such a practice would distort recognition and accommo-
dation of an ordering of constitutional values.
Courts do accommodate such an ordering, but, with few exceptions, 142
do not acknowledge that the justiciability threshold varies in accordance
with the claim asserted. As a result, justiciability adjudication appears
enigmatic, and legal pundits have been free to develop diverse explanations
of it.
For example, the Board of Governors of the Society of American Law
Teachers recently asserted that the Burger Court has systematically refor-
mulated or misapplied Warren Court jurisdictional requisites so as to impede
or restrict federal court adjudication of civil rights litigation, especially in
cases involving minorities or the poor. 143 Not surprisingly, the evidence is
unruly; a fair number of both Warren and Burger Court decisions do not
support this theory of general or selective restrictiveness.144 Moreover, the
138. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
139. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
140. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (1949).
141. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S.
Ct. 1428 (1977).
142. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1977); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
143. See Statement of the Board of Governors, Society of American Law Teachers (Oct.
10, 1976).
144. The Burger Court has handed down a number of expansive opinions in the area of
ripeness. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973); Lake Carriers Ass'n v.
MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 506-08 (1972). It has displayed the same liberality in regard to
mootness determinations. Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Burger Court) with
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969) (Warren Court). The Burger Court has
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observation contributes to an erroneous understanding of justiciability and
stimulates unpromising attempts at reform.
Hence, one public interest group seeks to relax standing requirements
by substituting the term "effects" for "injury," as if substantive issues of
legal interest and cognizable injury were simply problems of nomencla-
ture.145 Other statutory reform efforts rely on similarly talismanic terms such
as "indirect" or "incidental" cause or interest. 146 Such semantic exercises
may convey an attitude, but they are not responsive to troublesome deci-
sions that provoke reform, such as Warth or Richardson. Indeed, all of
these attempts to draft a statutory formula appear to ignore the extensive
experience over several decades with the standing mandate in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, which has not contributed to a constant or coherent
approach to the elaboration of standing. 1
47
Finally, the failure to confront questions about who may sue, when,
and over what issues as matters of actionability has inhibited the growth of a
body of public law for constitutional controversies. Standing and ripeness
issues have not been a notable feature of private law litigation because the
common law has carried the burden of resolving them under the formulation
expanded the concept of standing in certain instances. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97
S. Ct. 2010 (1977) (third party standing); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (third party
standing). Compare Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) with Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971) (comity). Abstention was similarly viewed by both Courts. See Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). See also Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Warren Court declined to augment federal jurisdiction).
145. See Proposal of Public Citizen Litigation Group, Remedial Standing Legislation
(Sept. 9, 1975) (submitted to the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
146. For example, a recent formulation by the Staff of the Subcommittee on Citizens and
Shareholders Rights and Remedies provides for public interest standing in all persons "who
may benefit directly, indirectly, or incidentally" from enforcement of a law of the United
States. It also mandates that any act that "directly, indirectly or incidentally contributes
toward jeopardizing any. . . benefit [to the plaintiff] shall be deemed to have caused injury in
fact." See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CITIZENS AND SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., DRAFT, CITIZENS' ACCESS TO THE
COURT ACT OF 1977 (1977). Although one can appreciate the difficulty of drafting legislation on
standing and causation, a plethora of adverbs does not provide a solution.
147. [E]xcept to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is dommitted to agency discretion by law. . . [a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1970). The judicial approach to standing
under this provision reflects considerable variation and transformation since enactment of the
Act in 1946. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1970); Scanwell Laboratories v.
Thomas, 424 F.2d 859, 865-73 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225
F.2d 924, 931-34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). See generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 22.00-3(4), 22.00-5 at 726 (Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 528-30 (1965); Albert, supra note 1, at 451-52, 475.
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of actionable claims. Without underestimating the difficulty of the task,
there is no inherent reason why a body of public law rules cannot do the
same in constitutional controversies. Such an approach, at a minimum,
would introduce some order and coherence to the intellectual disarray of
justiciability adjudications.

